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ABSTRACT
This study proposed a defi nition of perceived crisis severity and created a valid and reliable scale 
to measure the construct following Churchill’s scale development procedure. The proposed scale, 
after rigorous pilot testing and exploratory and confi rmatory factor analysis, contains 3 factors 
with 12 items. This study discusses potential applications of the developed measures and provides 
future research directions.
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Situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) is the most frequently 
tested theory in crisis communication research along with image repair 
theory (Avery, Lariscy, Kim, & Hocke, 2010). SCCT is the fi rst theory 
to integrate crisis situations with response strategies, arguing that the 
selection of a crisis response strategy is contingent on diff erent factors. 
It helps practitioners form a complete picture of a crisis dynamic rather 
than only thinking about what to say. Since its introduction, scholars 
have tested intensifi ers proposed by the theory, like prior reputation 
and crisis history (e.g., Coombs, 2004; Kiambi & Shafer, 2016). As more 
evidence is gained through empirical research, one variable initially 
proposed by SCCT draws the least attention and only reaches incon-
sistent fi ndings: crisis severity.
In the seminal empirical study, Coombs (1998) identifi ed two in-
tensifi ers that strengthen stakeholders’ responsibility attribution: crisis 
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history and the severity of damage. Severity of damage was nega-
tively correlated with crisis responsibility in the original experiment 
(Coombs, 1998) and so was excluded in later SCCT studies (Coombs, 
2007, 2010). Nonetheless, the concept of crisis severity continuously 
appears in crisis communication and management literature (Arpan 
& Pompper, 2003; Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; Claeys, Cauber-
ghe, & Vyncke, 2010; Hong & Len-Riós, 2015; Isaacson, 2012; Laufer, 
Gillespie, McBride, & Gonzalez, 2005; Lee, 2004; Vassilikopoulou, 
Siomkos, Chatzipanagiotou, & Pantouvakis, 2009). Scholars believe 
the intensity that stakeholders feel varies as the perceptions of crisis 
severity change. The negative outcomes of a crisis are influenced by the 
crisis severity, especially organizational reputation, such that as a crisis 
becomes more severe, organizational reputation suffers more (Claeys 
et al., 2010; Isaacson, 2012). 
In addition to the theoretical implications for understanding crisis 
dynamics, crisis severity can also influence crisis managers’ decisions. 
Stephens, Malone, and Bailey (2005) recommended considering the 
severity of a crisis when selecting one’s response strategy. Crisis manag-
ers need to evaluate a crisis situation, especially its severity and scope, 
before developing appropriate response strategies. Crisis response strate-
gies cannot be maximally effective if crisis managers underestimate or 
overestimate the magnitude of a crisis.
Despite the importance of crisis severity, there is no widely accepted 
definition. Studies that use the term crisis severity often refer to differ-
ent meanings. This discrepancy limits researchers’ understanding and 
analysis of this essential construct. More importantly, a lack of definition 
hinders the creation of a reliable and valid measurement. Current scales 
generally treat severity as a one-dimensional variable and ask only one 
question (Claeys et al., 2010; Laufer et al., 2005; Vassilikopoulou et al., 
2009) or three similar questions (Arpan & Pompper, 2003; Arpan & 
Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; Hong & Len-Riós, 2015). This oversimplifies 
the complexity of the construct. Without a valid measurement, find-
ings from any research are questionable. Hence this study intends to 
develop a valid and reliable measurement of crisis severity to advance 
the field of crisis communication.
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, we propose a definition 
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of perceived crisis severity by stakeholders and its dimensions using 
a comprehensive literature review. Second, based on the constructed 
definition, we develop a measure of perceived crisis severity and validate 
the scale by following Churchill’s (1979) guidelines. Churchill proposed 
an eight-step scale validation process: specify the domain of construct, 
generate a sample of items, collect data, purify the measure, collect data, 
assess reliability, assess validity, and develop norms.
Defining the Construct and Searching for Measurements
Perceived Crisis Severity Defined
SCCT assumes that an organization’s reputation is a valued resource 
that can be threatened by crises. During a crisis, an organization’s goal 
is to evaluate the situation and select appropriate response strategies to 
protect its reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). Early SCCT studies 
discussed severity of damage (crisis severity) along with crisis respon-
sibility and crisis history (Coombs, 1995, 1998; Coombs & Holladay, 
1996, 2002). Coombs (1995) argued that damage could be any form of 
death, injury, property destruction, or environmental harm (Coombs, 
1995). Crisis severity was operationalized as “the amount of damage 
generated by a crisis including financial, human, and environmental 
damage” (Coombs & Holladay, 2002, p. 169). 
At the first empirical attempt, Coombs (1998) predicted that as 
the severity of crisis damage increases, an organization’s image be-
comes more negative, and the organization’s perceived crisis respon-
sibility is strengthened. However, Coombs found the reverse of this 
hypothesis—minor degrees of severity incurred greater crisis responsi-
bility attribution and more negative image evaluation. Coombs claimed 
that stakeholders’ sympathy toward the organization caused the reverse 
finding. Lee (2004) similarly proposed that higher crisis severity leads 
to more crisis responsibility, more negative impressions, less sympathy, 
and less trust. Likewise, none of these hypotheses were significant. Park 
and Len-Riós (2010) followed this line of research and added some 
explanations. They hypothesized that people attribute more crisis re-
sponsibility to an organization when a consumer is the injured party. 
In contrast, if the injured party is the organization, people attribute 
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less crisis responsibility. However, empirical evidence did not support 
their prediction. No interaction was found between crisis severity and 
injured party (Park & Len-Riós, 2010).
While the aforementioned studies failed to find the hypothesized 
effects of crisis severity, other studies revealed that crisis severity is 
positively associated with stakeholders’ blame and negatively associated 
with reputation and purchase intent (Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; 
Claeys et al., 2010; Isaacson, 2012; Laufer et al., 2005). Some researchers 
investigated crisis severity from a different angle, assuming it is impor-
tant to minimize people’s perceptions of crisis severity. These studies 
treated crisis severity as a dependent variable. Arpan and Pompper 
(2003) indicated that the “stealing thunder” strategy, which refers to “an 
admission of a weakness before that weakness is announced by another 
party” (p. 294), could effectively reduce crisis severity levels. Hong and 
Len-Riós (2015) also demonstrated that university sports crises cause 
higher perceptions of crisis severity than product-recall crises.
Although scholars extensively use the term crisis severity, definitions 
vary. As discussed previously, Coombs and Holladay (2002) defined 
crisis severity as “the amount of damage generated by a crisis including 
financial, human, and environmental damage” (p. 169). This definition 
indicates that crisis severity refers to the actual damage a crisis incurs. 
However, other scholars have examined crisis severity from stakehold-
ers’ points of view. Park and Len-Riós (2010) argued that “the severity 
of damage is not necessarily a function of actual damage, but of percep-
tions” (p. 595). They claimed that the perception of crisis severity can 
vary according to media portrayals and definitions. Claeys et al. (2010) 
also suggested that researchers use perceived crisis severity instead of 
the actual damage. The definition of a crisis as “the perception of an 
unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stake-
holders and can seriously impact an organization’s performance and 
generate negative outcomes” (Coombs, 2007, pp. 2–3) implies that the 
existence of a crisis is determined by stakeholders’ perceptions. Even 
if an organization does not believe there is a crisis, the crisis exists as 
long as stakeholders believe it exists. The same logic should apply to 
the definition of crisis severity. Even if an organization does not believe 
a crisis is severe, the crisis is severe as long as stakeholders believe it is. 
A Measure of Perceived Severity in Organizational Crises 43
As such, it is more significant to investigate perceived crisis severity 
rather than actual severity. 
Although crisis severity is frequently discussed, no unified defini-
tion of the concept exists. This study defines perceived crisis severity as 
“stakeholders’ objective and emotional assessment of the intensity of a 
crisis.” This definition contains three key elements. First, this study con-
siders crisis severity from stakeholders’ perspectives. A crisis is severe 
as long as stakeholders perceive it to be severe. Second, the perceived 
severity of a crisis can vary among different stakeholder groups. For 
example, a crisis situation might be severe to a community but not to 
investors. Third, the assessment of severity is based on both cold and 
hot judgments. Cold judgment refers to objective assessments, such as 
who is affected by the crisis or, whether the crisis impacts my own life. 
Stakeholders use logic and knowledge to infer the severity of a crisis. 
Hot judgment refers to the uneasiness a crisis brings people. People are 
emotional, and so the initial psychological impact of a crisis on people 
largely influences people’s judgments. As Coombs and Holladay (2005) 
have discussed, a crisis usually generates negative emotions among 
stakeholders. Evaluations of crisis severity are less likely to be based 
solely on critical thinking; instead, cognition and emotion together 
influence stakeholders’ judgments.
Current Measures of Crisis Severity
Scholars in crisis communication commonly use survey and experi-
mental methods to examine perceived crisis severity. Experimental 
studies manipulate crisis situations to control severity. Coombs’s (1998) 
seminal work labeled little property damage and nonserious injuries 
as minor damage and huge property damage and serious injuries as 
major damage. Lee (2004) regarded 200 injuries as a severe crisis and 
300 deaths as an extremely severe crisis resulting from a plane crash. 
Isaacson (2012) regarded the theft of $15,000 a high-severity crisis and 
the theft of a small amount of money a low-severity crisis. Although 
these experimental studies explained the effect of perceived crisis se-
verity, their contribution to crisis severity measurement is limited. As 
crisis types diversify, some crises do not cause death, injury, or property 
damage but could still be categorized as mild or severe in terms of crisis 
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severity. For example, data breach crises almost always influence large 
numbers of people and cause concerns about the security of their identi-
ties and financial information, though no death or injury is involved.
In survey research, scholars have used single-item scales to measure 
crisis severity, for example, asking how severe respondents consider the 
crisis situation to be based on either a 10-point scale or an 11-point scale 
(Claeys et al., 2010; Laufer et al., 2005; Vassilikopoulou et al., 2009). 
Other scholars have used multiple-item scales, for example, asking 
about participants’ feelings of seriousness, badness, and extremeness 
regarding a crisis (Arpan & Pompper, 2003; Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 
2005; Hong & Len-Riós, 2015).
These crisis severity scales have two major drawbacks. First, nearly 
all studies treat crisis severity as a one-dimensional construct. Some ask 
only one question (Claeys et al., 2010; Laufer et al., 2005; Vassilikopou-
lou et al., 2009). Even scales with multiple items do not demonstrate 
different dimensions in crisis severity (Arpan & Pompper, 2003; Arpan 
& Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; Hong & Len-Riós, 2015). Second, none of 
the studies have considered the perspectives of publics. The scales do 
not answer to whom a crisis is severe. Stakeholders who are more af-
fected by the crisis are likely to have different crisis severity perceptions 
than those who are less affected by the crisis. In short, perceived crisis 
severity differs among stakeholders.
Proposed Dimensions and Items
Perceived crisis severity is not regarded as a multidimensional con-
struct and does not have a widely accepted measurement. To develop a 
multidimensional measure of perceived crisis severity, the researchers 
consulted with literature from related disciplines, including psychology 
and marketing.
Psychological Origin: Defensive Attribution
The concept of defensive attribution initially appeared in psychology 
literature as early as the 1960s. Walster (1966) argued that the worse the 
consequences of an accident, the greater responsibility people would 
attribute to the wrongdoer. She explained that if a person only suffers 
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small losses, people commonly believe the unpleasant thing could hap-
pen to anyone even if he or she did nothing wrong. On the other hand, 
if an accident becomes more severe and unpleasant, people feel the 
unpleasant thing could happen not only to “anybody” but to “you.” In 
this situation, people seek someone who is responsible for the accident 
to assure themselves. Fiske and Taylor (1991) elaborated on the defensive 
attribution hypothesis in a similar fashion. An accident becomes less 
tolerable as its consequences become more severe. People are afraid 
similar things will happen to them; blaming the person who causes 
the accident makes it predictable and avoidable (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).
Since the introduction of defensive attribution, various studies have 
been conducted to test its hypotheses. Most studies have confirmed 
the positive relationship between outcome severity and responsibility 
attribution, though some research has found the relationship to be insig-
nificant or even negative (Shaver, 1970; Thomas & Parpal, 1987; Walster, 
1966). The results of two meta-analyses, however, generally confirm 
the defensive attribution hypothesis (Burger, 1981; Robbennolt, 2000).
As studies on defensive attribution accumulated, the concept was 
introduced to marketing communication. Laufer et al. (2005) claimed 
that findings of defensive attribution in psychology could also shed 
light on marketing communication research. The authors argued that 
the severity of product failure and product-harm crises vary. Minor 
problems and severe problems will create different blame attribution. 
However, blame attribution may also influence how people perceive the 
severity of a crisis. In other words, blame attribution could be both an 
antecedent and outcome of severity. The two concepts are intertwined 
and influence each other. Therefore this study regards stakeholders’ 
blame as a tentative dimension of perceived crisis severity. Although 
blame cannot determine severity, the magnitude of stakeholders’ blame 
attribution reflects their perceived crisis severity.
Service Failure Severity: A Service Marketing Perspective
Service failure severity (also known as the magnitude of service failure) 
is a service marketing concept comparable to crisis severity. Service 
failure severity is defined as “a customer’s perceived intensity of a 
service problem” (Weun, Beatty, & Jones, 2004, p. 135). Perceived loss 
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is closely interwoven with service failure severity. The more intense 
or severe a service problem, the greater the customer’s perceived loss 
(Chuang, Cheng, Chang, & Yang, 2012; Weun et al., 2004). Riaz and 
Khan (2016) even defined service failure severity as “the measure of 
the enormity of the loss that a consumer faces as an outcome of service 
failure” (p. 426). In a similar vein, empirical studies confirmed that as 
service failure severity increases, customers’ dissatisfaction (McCol-
lough, 2009), disloyalty (Wang, Wu, Lin, & Wang, 2011), and negative 
word of mouth (Weun et al., 2004) increase correspondingly.
Service failure severity and crisis severity bear two similarities. 
First, service failure and crises are negative and unexpected events 
that occur to a person or an organization. They both bring financial 
and reputational losses. Second, the magnitude of both service failure 
severity and crisis severity is determined by people’s perceptions. The 
difference between the two concepts lies in audiences. For a service 
failure, the audience is primarily customers. For a crisis, an organiza-
tion should communicate with several stakeholder groups in addition 
to customers (e.g., shareholders, employees).
Regardless of differences between the two concepts, one could adopt 
ideas and dimensions from service failure severity measurement when 
developing a crisis severity scale. Two measurement scales are widely 
applied in service marketing. One scale contains three items (Inyang, 
2015; Wang et al., 2011; Weun et al., 2004), and the other one includes 
four items (Riaz & Khan, 2016; Tsarenko & Tojib, 2012). These items 
measure two concepts: emotion and relevance. Items measuring “angry,” 
“unpleasant,” and “stress” represent human emotions. These items cor-
respond to Lee’s (2004) argument that high crisis severity may incur 
negative emotional reactions. Therefore, this study deems emotion an 
important dimension of crisis severity. Other items measure the level of 
inconvenience a service failure brings to participants, which is concep-
tually similar to relevance in crisis communication. Lee contended that 
the more severe the crisis, the more personal involvement/relevance it 
has. Laufer and colleagues (2005) argued that relatively minor problems 
involve mild inconvenience to stakeholders. Thus relevance is another 
important dimension of severity. These two dimensions from service 
failure severity scales will be referenced as relevance-induced severity and 
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emotion-induced severity. Finally, this study regards blame attribution 
from defensive attribution literature as a third dimension of perceived 
crisis severity that will be referenced as blame-induced severity.
Thus the initial construct contains three dimensions: blame-induced, 
relevance-induced, and emotion-induced severity. Since the three 
dimensions are similar to existing concepts in crisis communication, 
we consulted existing measures of these variables. Blame-induced 
severity items were adopted from the items of an organizational crisis 
responsibility scale (Brown & Ki, 2013). Emotion-induced severity items 
were drawn from service failure severity scales (Tsarenko & Tojib, 2012; 
Weun et al., 2004). Relevance-induced severity items were drawn from 
the personal involvement inventory (Zaichkowsky, 1994) and service 
failure severity scales (Tsarenko & Tojib, 2012; Weun et al., 2004). To 
enlarge the initial item pool, researchers referred to dictionary defini-
tions of blame, emotion, and relevance and created several new items. 
Accordingly, the following research question is proposed:
RQ1: What is a reliable and valid measure of perceived crisis severity?
Pilot Testing
Pilot tests were conducted prior to the main data collection. First, a 
group of doctoral students specializing in the communication discipline 
were asked to read five crisis scenarios designed to stimulate research 
subjects and evaluate initial scale items. This procedure improved the 
logic and readability of the crisis scenarios. 
After the first pilot test, the researchers invited nine experts in 
crisis communication to evaluate the quality of the scale. The study 
employed Lawshe’s (1975) quantitative approach, the content validity 
ratio (CVR), to determine the agreement among experts. The scholars 
read the definitions of the target construct and its three dimensions 
and then were asked to evaluate the proposed dimensions and items 
based on three categories: essential, useful but not essential, and not 
necessary. Based on these experts’ evaluations, CVRs were computed, 
and only two items passed the recommended cutoff of .78 (Lawshe, 
1975), while the other items were challenged by the scholars. In addition 
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to completing the CVR form, scholars were asked to comment on the 
adequacy of the three dimensions to measure the perceived crisis sever-
ity construct and the accuracy of the definitions. The blame-induced 
dimension reached the least agreement of the three dimensions. The 
expert scholars questioned the discriminant validity of this dimension, 
arguing that some crises are inherently severe but unnecessarily cause 
strong blame, such as natural disasters. These comments were applied 
to revise the items. After the two rounds of reviews by students and 
scholars separately, initial content validity was achieved.
Crisis Situation Manipulations
All crises used in this study happened between 2014 and 2016 and are 
well known by publics in the United States. The five crisis situations 
included the Ashley Madison data breach, the University of Missouri 
racism protests, the Wells Fargo fraudulent account scandal, the Volks-
wagen emission scandal, and Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. Each crisis 
scenario was presented in a short paragraph ranging from 96 to 123 
words. Only basic information was given, such as time, organization 
name, the cause of the crisis, and victims involved.
Full Administration
Sample
The study recruited 300 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
but after a comprehension check, only data from 290 participants were 
kept for further analysis. The sample primarily consisted of males (61%; 
n = 177), while females made up 38.6% (n = 112). The racial makeup of 
the sample was as follows: 76.6% Caucasian (n = 222), 10.7% Asian and 
Pacific Islander (n = 31), 6.9% African American (n = 20), and 6.6% 
Latinx or Hispanic (n = 19). Some subjects identified themselves as 
multiracial. The average age of the participants was 34.79 years, with 
a range between 20 and 70 years. This data set was used to conduct 
all statistical analyses, except confirmatory factor analysis. For con-
firmatory factor analysis, data were collected from 182 participants 
on Amazon Mechanical Turk. About half of the sample were male 
(n = 90) and half were female (n = 92). The racial makeup of the sample 
was as follows: 40.7% Asian (n = 74), 38.5% Caucasian (n = 70), 7.1% 
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Native American (n = 13), 6% African American (n = 11), and 5.5% 
Latinx or Hispanic (n = 10). The average age of the participants was 
29.18 years, with a range between 18 and 67 years.1
Procedures
The study created five crisis scenarios, which covered different types of 
organizations and crises. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the five scenarios. After reading a crisis, participants were required 
to answer two comprehension check questions. One asked them to 
identify the type of the crisis, and the other was to identify the name 
of the organization. Participants who failed to give correct answers 
were excluded from further analysis to ensure data quality. Partici-
pants were then asked to rate their agreement on measurement items 
based on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree).
Measure Purification
A correlation matrix was generated among all 24 items. The initial 
check indicated that all items in the blame-induced dimension were 
not correlated with other items, p > .05. This result raises convergent 
validity issues. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was implemented, and 
the result demonstrated that the factor containing all blame-induced 
severity items had low correlation with other factors (with relevance, 
r = .00; with emotion, r = .06). The test further confirmed the convergent 
validity problem. Based on panel suggestions and the EFA result, the 
study theoretically and statistically rejected the feasibility of the blame-
induced severity dimension and removed the seven items. Therefore 
the statistical examination started from two dimensions with 17 items 
to develop the scale for perceived crisis severity.
Validity Assessment
Exploratory Factor Analysis
Before conducting EFA, the correlation matrix was first assessed to 
determine factorability of the matrix. Three examinations were applied: 
(a) Bartlett’s test of sphericity, (b) the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) 
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test, and (c) individual measures of sampling adequacy (MSA). Pett, 
Lackey, and Sullivan (2003) recommended that the test of sphericity 
should be significant, KMO should be higher than .7, and MSA should 
be higher than .7. In the analysis, KMO equaled .933, and Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity was .00. The values of 24 MSAs ranged from .888 to .975. 
All indicators showed the data set is factorable.
The determination of the number of factors was based on multiple 
standards: (a) eigenvalue greater than 1, (b) scree plot, (c) percentage of 
variance extracted, (d) Velicer’s minimum average partial (MAP) test, 
and (e) parallel analysis. First, according to the Kaiser–Guttman rule of 
eigenvalues greater than 1, three factors were extracted. An examination 
of the scree plot also confirmed a three-factor solution. The EFA with 
principal component analysis (PCA) method indicated that the three 
factors explained 72.13% of the total variance, while EFA with principal 
axis factoring (PAF) showed that the three factors explained 66.25% of 
the total variance. However, the standard of eigenvalue greater than 1 is 
widely criticized by scholars. Gorsuch (1983) claimed that this method 
is only accurate when the number of variables is smaller than 40 and 
the sample size is large. Zwick and Velicer (1986) were also strongly 
against using this rule. Therefore, a MAP test was implemented, and the 
result confirmed the three-factor conclusion. Fifth, the study executed 
parallel analysis with both PCA and PAF methods. The PCA method 
indicated that two factors should be extracted, while the PAF method 
recommended four factors. Based on these five test results, we selected 
the three-factor model supported by four of the five tests.
The EFA using PAF method based on three factors was executed. The 
study first employed two types of oblique rotations (direct oblimin and 
promax), since they assume correlation among factors. Nevertheless, 
both rotations generated complex structure matrices that contained 
serious cross-loading issues. Thus the researchers decided to use or-
thogonal rotation (varimax) to increase interpretability. The rotated 
factor matrix created by orthogonal rotation was more interpretable 
than the structure matrix generated by oblique rotation. Then, five items 
with weak loading and cross-loading problems were removed based 
on three standards: (a) item loadings on the primary factor must be 
above .6, (b) the difference between the highest loading and the second 
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highest loading must be at least .3, and (c) the commonalities must be 
higher than .5. After removing the problematic items, the study ran 
the EFA using PAF method with varimax rotation the second time and 
generated ideal factor loadings for the scale. 
Based on the EFA report, the relevance-induced dimension split 
into two factors. One factor was defined as relevance. The other factor 
was defined as interest-induced severity, since the four items concerned 
stakeholders’ interests about a crisis. A detailed conceptualization is 
discussed in a later section. The three-factor model (emotion, relevance, 
and interest) with 12 items was retained for further analysis (interest, 
α = .91, M = 4.84, SD = .22; emotion, α = .94, M = 3.68, SD = .14; 
relevance, α = .88, M = 3.41, SD = .51).
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)
CFA was used to further test construct validity and the relationships 
among the three dimensions. According to Hu and Bentler (1999), a 
good model should pass the following cutoffs: .06 or smaller for root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA); .95 or greater for com-
parative fit index (CFI), normed-fit index (NFI), and incremental fit 
index (IFI); and normed chi-square smaller than 5. The initial model 
fit indicators did not meet these standards. RMSEA was larger than 1, 
and other model fit indices were smaller than .95. Covariances among 
error terms were added according to modification indices, and the 
CFA was rerun. The second CFA demonstrated that the model ideally 
fit the data. All modification indices were acceptable, ranging from 
4.06 to 4.83. Other indicators also showed favorable results, χ2 = 66.331, 
df = 38, χ2/df = 1.411 (RMSEA = .048, CFI = .990, NFI = .966, IFI = .990).
Reliability Assessment
The reliability of the overall scale was .95 (M = 4.87, SD = .29). The reli-
abilities of the three dimensions were also acceptable: interest-induced 
(α = .92, M = 5.24, SD = .07), emotion-induced (α = .91, M = 4.69, 
SD = .14), and relevance-induced (α = .91, M = 4.70, SD = .16). The 
appendix provides the final scale.
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Discussion
Two purposes of this study are (a) to offer a definition of perceived crisis 
severity and (b) to develop a valid and reliable scale to measure the 
construct. Following Churchill’s (1979) scale development guidelines, a 
three-dimensional scale with 12 items was found to be reliable and valid.
Through theoretical and statistical investigation, the study pro-
posed a three-dimensional scale with 12 items to measure perceived 
crisis severity. Blame-induced severity, an initially proposed dimen-
sion, was excluded from the study based on theoretical and statistical 
examination. The remaining two dimensions with 17 items generated 
three factors. After a preliminary EFA test and structure-based CFA 
test, the relevance-induced severity dimension from the initial scale 
was further divided into two factors, relevance-induced severity and 
interest-induced severity. The definitions of emotion-induced sever-
ity and relevance-induced severity were retained. Emotion-induced 
severity denotes a member of a public’s affective response to a crisis. 
Relevance-induced severity is defined as the extent to which a member 
of a public feels involved in and affected by a crisis. Interest-induced 
severity was reconceptualized based on the theme of the measure-
ment items. Interest-induced severity represents the extent to which a 
member of a public desires to know more about a crisis. The three-
dimensional scale contains four items for emotion-induced severity, 
three items for relevance-induced severity, and four items for interest-
induced severity.
The three dimensions are strongly associated with perceived crisis 
severity. As a crisis becomes more severe, stakeholders may become 
more emotional because they are surprised or scared by the situation. 
A severe crisis may interest stakeholders because it might threaten their 
safety. Stakeholders are also willing to know more about the situation 
and how to protect themselves. Stakeholders might feel more personally 
involved, thus perceiving greater relevance as the situation becomes 
more severe, since they are potential victims of a similar crisis. The 
three dimensions are also associated with each other. Stakeholders 
may not be interested in the situation if the crisis is not relevant to 
them. If stakeholders do not feel involvement or relevance regard-
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ing the crisis, they are less likely to be emotional about the crisis.
This new crisis severity scale has a distinct advantage over other ex-
isting scales because it is the first scale to consider dimensionality issues. 
Scales with only one or three items lack accuracy because a respondent’s 
reflection could be easily influenced by his or her instant thoughts. In 
addition, if a scale only contains one item, it cannot assess reliability or 
validity. With the creation of this multidimensional scale, researchers 
may check reliability and validity when they measure crisis severity.
To the best of the researchers’ knowledge, this study is the first to 
operationalize the concept of perceived crisis severity and develop a 
multidimensional scale for the construct. Since the concept of perceived 
crisis severity has been discussed and examined in crisis literature over 
time, the operational definition and new scale could generate further 
discussion and facilitate this line of research. The inconsistent findings 
revealed in previous studies could potentially be resolved by the em-
ployment of this scale. In addition, since SCCT initially proposed this 
concept, the operationalization of perceived crisis severity could help 
other scholars reconsider the importance of the construct in the SCCT 
model. As crisis severity generates different public perceptions of an 
organization and a crisis situation, SCCT should consider if perceived 
crisis severity influences other variables in the model. Since SCCT aims 
to explain a crisis dynamic and guide the response strategy selection 
process, the addition of the crisis severity construct can increase the 
explanatory power of the model.
Practically, crisis managers could consider the dimensions included 
in the new scale when they want to assess whether the influence of a 
crisis is powerful. As Coombs (1995) stated, the severity of a crisis in-
fluences an organization’s strategy selection. In a severe crisis, publics 
expect certain explanations about the situation, and an organization 
should seek strategies to soothe publics (Coombs, 1995). Therefore crisis 
managers could survey a small group of stakeholders about perceived 
crisis severity. If the result shows that the crisis is severe, crisis manag-
ers must pay more attention to the situation and design strategies that 
do not antagonize stakeholders.
The proposed dimensions could also guide an organization’s crisis 
message selection process. In certain situations, an organization may 
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hope to intentionally increase or decrease stakeholders’ perceived crisis 
severity. For example, when Zika virus hits, people may not be fully 
aware of the potential harm it may bring. However, the government 
wants to increase people’s awareness of the issue and intentionally in-
crease people’s perceived crisis severity. When drafting public messages, 
they should think about how to make Zika virus relevant to people. 
In addition, the message should also arouse people’s emotions, such 
as fear and stress. The message should also arouse people’s interest in 
keeping track of the development of the crisis.
Limitations and Future Research
The study bears three major limitations. The first limitation resides in 
crisis situations. Although the study included five crisis scenarios to 
cover multiple types of crises and organizations, it is still premature 
to assume that the scale applies to all types of crises. Second, since the 
study employed real crises and organizations, prior reputation might 
contaminate participants’ perceptions of severity. Third, different types 
of validity such as discriminant validity, convergent validity, and pre-
dictive validity, were not discussed in this study.
Future research should apply the new scale to test the key relation-
ships in the SCCT model, especially the relationship between severity 
and responsibility as well as the relationship between severity and 
reputation. Establishing and confirming these relationships would 
further explicate and improve SCCT.
Regardless of its limitations, this study provides a useful instrument 
to measure an important construct, perceived crisis severity in crisis 
communication, and the researchers believe that adding a perceived 
crisis severity variable can help form a holistic view of crisis situations 
and advance the understanding of crisis dynamics.
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Appendix: The Final Perceived Crisis Severity Scale
Interest-Induced Severity (α = .92, M = 5.24, SD = .07)
IIS 1: I care about the crisis.
IIS 2: Further news about the incident is of my interest.
IIS 3: I hope to know more about the incident.
IIS 4: I think the crisis interests me.
Emotion-Induced Severity (α = .91, M = 4.69, SD = .14)
EIS 1: The crisis incurred my sense of stress.
EIS 2: I feel quite anxious about the crisis.
EIS 3: My apprehension grew as I knew more about the crisis.
EIS 4: I’m worried about the crisis situation.
Relevance-Induced Severity (α = .91, M = 4.70, SD = .16)
RIS 1: I feel influenced by this crisis.
RIS 2: I feel involved in the crisis.
RIS 3: I find this crisis relevant to me.
RIS 4: The crisis is meaningful to me.
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Note
1. Both data sets include missing values in gender and race and people who 
identify themselves as multiracial. Therefore the gender and race breakdowns 
do not equal overall sample size.
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